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CRIME AS A SOCIAL INDICATOR

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Introduction

The curve in figure 1 represents convictions for theft in Sweden since 1831 (von Hofer & Tham 1983). What is the social meaning of such a curve? What is its sociological significance? To say that crime - quantified in one way or another - is a social indicator is not much of an answer since the question immediately becomes: What then does it indicate?

Figure 1. Convictions for theft in Sweden 1831-1987.

Per 100 000 population 15-64 years. Log. scale.



I will try to distinguish four different meanings of the idea of crime as a social indicator, namely, crime as an indicator of

- integration,
- marginalization,
- victimization, and
- stigmatization.

The first refers to the moral unity of a community, the second to the level and distribution of material welfare and living conditions, the third to the risk of becoming a victim of a crime, and the fourth to the reaction of the state against lawbreakers. These four ways of

viewing crime will be discussed in hopes of reaching some tentative conclusions about their applicability in social reporting.

Crime as an indicator of integration


The idea of crime as an indicator of the integration or the moral state of a nation is not uncommon in political rhetorics and public debate. The crime trends in Western countries will be used to characterize the general moral development in our types of societies. Conservatives will see the rise in crime as a sign of a welfare system that undermines personal responsibility and promotes laziness and apathy; socialists as an expression of the egoistic and exploitative nature of capitalism; and Greens as an indicator of the development of a large-scale, anonymous society.

The theoretical basis for this perception of crime rates was established in the first half of the 19th century. During that period, men like Adolphe Quetelet and André-Michael Guerry laid the foundation of the tradition of moral statistics. The prime interest of this school of thought was not the rate of crime, suicide, drunkenness, divorces, or children born out of wedlock per se. It was instead these phenomena as infractions against common rules as indicators of the moral state of the nations (Jaakkola 1984). The foremost exponent of regarding deviance in this way is of course Emile Durkheim. His contribution to the field of social indicators is that he utilized rates of rare behavior, such as suicide, as an indicator of a more general condition in society, such as the degree of anomie or normlessness (Durkheim 1967).

It is, however, not altogether clear how these early statisticians understood the relationship between the crime rates and the like and the morals of the entire population. A certain rate of recorded crime in a population can be obtained through different relations be-

tween the morals of those committing crimes and the morals of the rest of the community. Some examples are given in figure 2.

Figure 2. Distribution of morals in populations.



The horizontal axis marks the range from "good" to "bad" citizens, where the very bad ones- the criminals - can be found on the extreme left (compare Wilkins 1964). Both distribution I and distribution II can be said to be properties of a nation and both could yield the same average crime rate. However, only number I has a direct bearing on the morals of the entire population and it therefore has a greater value as a general social indicator. The "bad" ones are just a little worse than the "almost bad" ones, and the criminals form the end of a continuum. In distribution II, the criminals should be seen as a group more or less cut off from the general population in a moral sense.

The differences might be easier to see if we insert two additional distributions which might be regarded as the original distributions at a later stage. In both cases, crime has increased but in different ways. In distribution III, the rise was caused by a general deterioration of the morals in the population. More people will now consider and commit a criminal act. In distribution IV, the rise in crime has been obtained by an increase in the number of persons who will commit crimes, while at the same time the morals of the great

majority have remained unchanged. The crime-prone population may also have been stable in size but just moved on the horizontal axis committing more and more severe crimes. The criminal group is even more apart from the general population in terms of morally blameworthy acts.

On the whole, the approach of moral statistics has been seen as incompatible with modern criminological analysis and it has been abandoned by most criminologists (Jaakkola 1984). The moral issue seems to disappear when changes in crime rates are explained in terms of social and demographic changes. However, the approach is still alive and I would like to point out the particularly fruitful research by the Norwegian criminologist Nils Christie. Two examples will suffice to show how he uses criminological data to describe other and more general conditions in society.

In a historical comparison of rates of imprisonment in the Scandinavian countries, Christie tries to interpret the general decrease in prison populations in all the countries during the later part of the 19th century and the much higher level in Finland after World War I. He sees the development during the 19th century as a sign of deflation of the value of one day in prison. With the improvement of living conditions in general, the relative deprivation of being incarcerated increases. The prison sentence can therefore be shortened without any loss of the relative pain to be inflicted. Consequently, the development of the prison population during this period indicates that the suffering in the outside society had declined. The high level of imprisonment in Finland during the 20th century then reflects an inflation in the "penal value" of one day in prison - an inflation which was caused first by the civil war and then by Finland's participation in World War II. The prison sentence had to be accommodated to the changes in the level of suffering and general living conditions in the outside society (Christie 1968).

In another study, Christie voices concern about the declining number of libel cases which are brought to court. A society in which the number of libel cases decline is a society in which honour is no longer valued, in which an insult need not be settled, and in which people can withdraw from further interaction. This pattern applies to societies in which people care less about one another, and this is the

case in modern, anonymous societies. As can be seen from figure 3 showing the number of convictions for libel in Norway during the half century following World War I, the trend at least supports Christie's assumption (Christie 1975).

Figure 3. Convictions for libel in Norway 1921-1971.
Per 100 000 population.



A final example of research on crime as a moral indicator will be a study of my own. The starting point of the research was the notion of crime as an indicator of changes in solidarity in times of war. Two contradictory ideas can be found in the literature: the first one postulates that war strengthens morals and reduces crime; and the other one claims that war leads to demoralization with an accompanying increase in crime. A comparison of the Scandinavian countries during World War II can perhaps shed some light on the controversy. The countries are similar in social structure but dissimilar in their experience of the war - Finland as belligerent, Sweden as neutral (or at least non-participant), and Norway and Denmark as occupied (though to different degrees). The different war situations could be interpreted in terms of differences in the legitimacy of the political system with consequent effects on law-abidingness. Finland with its constitution in operation, its enormous sufferings, and its threatened existence should be expected to show the lowest crime level during the war. In Sweden the legitimacy of the government remained intact, but the pressure from an outside enemy was much less. In Norway the legitimacy of

the government ceased after the German occupation, and in Denmark it broke down finally in 1943 when the government resigned. But it is hard to say whether these circumstances should be expected to lead to split loyalties and increases in crime in Norway and Denmark or to strengthened solidarity with fellow countrymen and decreases in the theft rate.

Figure 4. Convictions for crimes of theft in Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden, 1937-1947. Index.




Figure 4 compares persons found guilty of theft in the Scandinavian countries (Iceland excluded) during World War II.¹ Theft has been chosen for the analysis since it is the quantitatively dominating crime. Moreover, theft is a relatively one-dimensional type of crime, the motive for which - individual (and illicit) economic gain - is presumably also valid during times of war.

Theft rose in all four countries up to 1943-44 and the development therefore hardly lends any support to the idea that war increases integration. An ad-hoc explanation that "it could have been worse" cannot be excluded, of course, but is difficult to test. Nor does it seem possible to save the hypothesis about improved morals during times of war by referring to the differences in war experience.

¹ The missing data for Denmark 1944-45 are due to the dissolution of the police by the occupying forces.

The theft curves hardly correspond to what could have been predicted on the basis of differences in the legitimacy of the existing systems.² A better explanation would be in economic rather than moral terms, and consider factors like inflation, decreasing real wages, and shortages of goods for private consumption (Jaakkola & Tham 1989).

Although it is tempting, caution is advised when using crime data as moral indicators. The interpretation of crime data on the aggregate level should be checked on the individual level as far as possible in order to avoid going astray. For instance, one objection to Christie's interpretation of the development of the sentences for libel is that libel cases at least in former times primarily reflected the maltreatment of household servants. A libel suit would be one of few ways possible to take revenge on a master or mistress for unfair treatment and therefore not indicate relations between equals (Sperlings 1976).

The statements in the literature should also be approached critically since they are not seldom characterized by a clear ideological bias. This is found in the writings on crime and war where the assertion that crime decreases during times of war often also expresses the author's general outlook on war. Finally, the relation between the deviants and the majority must be analysed in depth - both theoretically and empirically - before any conclusions can be drawn about crime and national integration. I would at least for the moment, not know what to say about the development of integration in Sweden on the basis of the theft curve.

Crime as an indicator of marginalization

The second way in which crime could be seen as a social indicator is as an indicator of marginalization in the sense of material welfare and living conditions. On the individual level, this is rather uncontroversial. Punishment is obviously non-welfare, and prison sentences for crime definitely mean low level-of-living for incarcerated per-

² The sharp rise in Finland in 1945 occurs when the war is more or less over for the country and can at least in part be attributed to the return of the mobilized forces to civilian society.

sons. Numerous studies have also shown that persons sentenced for repeated traditional crimes live under poor living conditions.

Of greater interest in the context of social indicators, however, is whether crime varies with general living conditions in such a way that crime is a sign of poverty in society. This idea stems from the tradition of liberal and radical writers of the last century. Friedrich Engels was early to see rising crime in the first part of the 19th century as an indicator of the proletarianization of the working-class (Engels 1971). And writers a hundred years ago predicted that crime would decrease or even vanish with increased standards of living and improved general education.

Returning to our theft curve, it is quite clear that limited periods with dramatically deteriorating living conditions have also been marked by sharp increases in property crimes. This is shown by the crop failure of 1867-68, by the last years of World War I and, to some extent, by World War II. The general decrease in theft during the second half of the 19th century also coincides with the gradual improvement in general living conditions. The same development can be observed in several Western nations for both crime and living standards (Zehr 1976).

However, the development of theft in Sweden during the last sixty years contradicts the expectations of the earlier radical writers. The development of theft probably does reflect improved living conditions but in an opposite way. One interpretation of the curve is that theft now follows the opportunities to steal. These opportunities are then a function of the development of goods for private consumption and the simultaneous decrease in the control of each single object. For instance, it has been shown that the number of car thefts follows the number of registered cars (von Hofer & Tham 1989; Lenke 1989a).

A way of salvaging the hypothesis that crime is a sign of poverty and the marginalization of certain segments of the population would be to turn to the notion of relative rather than absolute standards of living. This notion was of course also part of radical 19th century thinking. Our object of study would then be inequality and its relation to the level and development of crime. From this perspective the theft curve should be seen as an indicator of inequality

in modern Sweden. However, the picture of the overall development in Sweden during the last decades does not lend support to this hypothesis. Figure 5 shows that the number of persons found guilty of non-trivial offences has more than doubled between 1950 and 1980 (Rättsstatistisk årsbok 1988). During the same years, the equalization of income has been quite marked when measured through the maximum equalization coefficient as in figure 6 (Aberg, Selén & Tham 1987).

The hypothesis that rising crime indicates rising inequality might, however, still be saved in some way. The living conditions of small minority groups might deteriorate at the same time there is an overall tendency toward less inequality in society. The groups might be too small, even if they comprise tens or hundreds of thousand, to affect the total picture. Therefore, it may be the case that while the general standards of living and equality have increased in Sweden during the past decades, there are small but increasing groups that are lagging behind.

Figure 5. Persons sentenced to sanctions registered in the General Criminal Register in Sweden, 1950-1987. Per 100 000 population 15- years.





Figure 6. Development of income equalization in Sweden 1950-1980.
The maximum equalization coefficient.³



Some indicators actually support the view that such a development has taken place in Sweden. The number of social welfare recipients has not decreased since the 1950s and has even increased during the 1980s by as much as fifty percent. Since the end of the 1960s, there has been a sharp increase in the number of housing evictions (Stenberg 1986). The number of alcohol and narcotics abusers has risen dramatically since the end of World War II (even though the situation seems relatively stable since the mid-seventies). Furthermore, among those sentenced for crime, the increase in the proportion of recidivists seems to be particularly pronounced (von Hofer & Tham 1983).

These groups, which have all increased in size during the post-war period, are known to have below average living standards. Is there a common development in these groups which makes it reasonable to seek a common, underlying cause, perhaps a general aspect of the organization of Swedish society? I will rather tentatively put forward a possible answer to this question borrowing an analysis from Staffan Marklund and Stefan Svallfors.

Contrary to the beliefs of many people, the Swedish welfare state has strong in-built work incentives. The benefits of the welfare state are to a high degree tied to working-life. Members of the labour force are entitled not only to a salary but to a fairly good compensation if unable to work because of old age, sickness, work accident,

³ The Maximum Equalization Coefficient is a measure for the percentage of the total income needed to transfer from people with incomes above the median to those below it to achieve equalized incomes for everyone.

parental duties, or unemployment as well. However, if an individual for some reason is not in the labour force, he or she clearly falls behind in term of economic resources. And even if the group outside the labour force decreases, the marginalization of those left outside becomes more marked (Marklund & Svallfors 1987). Typical of the groups discussed here is a large proportion who is not well integrated in the labour market. Therefore, the rising crime trend, and in particular the rise in recidivism, may reflect a general tendency towards greater difficulties for those in the active ages who are not part of the work force.

I will now sum up the discussion on crime as an indicator of material welfare. There is a relationship between crime and the general level of living, but the direction of the relationship will depend on the developmental status of the society. Given the conditional nature of this relationship, it might be possible to use crime data in order to predict data on crop failures, market imbalances, levels of private consumption, and so on, where such data are missing.

The idea that crime varies directly with overall inequality does not seem to hold true today. However, a rise in crime and other measures of deviance might indicate that small segments of the population are falling behind in the Western societies. If we look at figure 2 again, this time regarding the curves as distributions of level-of-living in the population, the development from II to IV could illustrate the background of rising crime. And if such marginalization is a result of properties of the welfare system and of modern, rational work life, then crime data become an important indicator of a central tendency in our type of society.

Crime as an indicator of victimization

The third way of interpreting the crime curve would be the most obvious one, that is, regarding it as an indicator of victimization. As such, it can be seen as a specific aspect of welfare or level-of-living, namely, as an indicator of "security of life and property". In this specific sense, the official crime statistics in Sweden would indicate reduced welfare over time. Theft crimes have multiplied since

World War II and crimes of violence have been increasing since the mid-sixties.

An immediate objection to such an interpretation may be that the official crime statistics are only indicators of the changing and discretionary practices of the criminal justice system - an objection which then could also be directed against the two previously presented interpretations.

However, this objection can be challenged. Most crimes against individuals, which are those of primary interest in a level-of-living context, are reported to the police by the citizens themselves. They are therefore much less subject to police discretion than, say, narcotics crimes.

Another way of validating the official statistics, at least when it comes to theft, is through statistics compiled by the insurance companies. Since the proportion of insured households is quite high in Sweden, most burglaries and car thefts are also reported to the insurance companies. If minor theft is excluded, the official theft statistics and the insurance statistics coincide quite well. (This correspondence, however, can be problematic in itself. Through their policies the insurance companies probably to some degree help shape the official crime statistics, see Lenke 1989a - a matter, however, which I cannot go in more detail into here).

One way of validating the official crime statistics is through victim surveys. Such surveys have been carried out by Statistics Sweden on a yearly basis since the mid-seventies, as part of their general level-of-living studies. Periodically, the questions on crime in these surveys are expanded in order to allow for a more thorough analysis. Questions on victimization have also been included in the level-of-living studies carried out by the Swedish Institute for Social Research. These surveys, which include a panel, were conducted in 1968, 1974, and 1981 - however, the first survey did not include questions on victimization.⁴ Here again, the official theft statistics are supported by the results from the level-of-living surveys con-

⁴ The questions from these surveys are given in English and in German in the appendix.

ducted by Statistics Sweden as well as by comparisons of the Scandinavian countries (Tham 1989).

If we regard it to be important to have indicators of victimization in society, why then bother at all with special victim surveys? The official crime statistics exist, in many cases for a long period of time, and they cost the researcher nothing to collect. The answer to this is that the data from victim surveys offer some advantages. One has already been mentioned - that of validating the official crime statistics. The surveys have confirmed these statistics to a great degree. Another advantage is that they allow an analysis of victimization rates in different strata of society. The risk facing single mothers, immigrants, and young working-class boys in large cities can be compared to the average risk. For instance, the surveys from Statistics Sweden have revealed quite high risks among single mothers of becoming a victim of violence (Levnadsförhållanden 1978).

Still another use for victim data, if they have been collected within a level-of-living survey, is the analysis of their co-variation with other welfare problems concerning, for instance, health, employment, housing, and political resources. The results from the Swedish studies indicate that the distribution of the risk of becoming a property-crime victim actually contributes to a reduction of the overall inequality in society. The risk is highest in the upper classes - which of course is primarily explained by its members having more property (Tham 1984).

In spite of these advantages, there is, however, reason to warn against an exaggerated faith in victim surveys. I will briefly discuss five reservations - the three last ones all dealing with crimes of violence. The first reservation concerns the fact that victimization is a relatively rare event. Crimes of violence with bodily harm or visible marks are reported by one percent of the adult population annually. When this number is divided into subcategories, the probability of obtaining statistically significant results drops rapidly. This is also true for the possibility of measuring changes over time. When it comes to crimes of property, the victimization rate of course is higher. If, however, these questions are not limited to somewhat more serious crimes, one runs the risk of comparing burgla-

ries with the loss of a pair of children's gloves at school. There is, therefore, a clear limit to the analyses that can be conducted.

The second reservation has to do with the non-response rate among certain groups. Marginal groups in society are known to have relatively high victimization rates. Not seldom do they appear both as victims and as perpetrators. The non-response rate in surveys has also been shown to be higher for such groups. In the level-of-living surveys of the Swedish Institute for Social Research, both social welfare recipients and recidivists in crime showed above average non-response rates. This introduces a bias in the analysis of the living conditions of marginal groups.

The third reservation involves the discrepancy between the official statistics and the victim surveys regarding crimes of violence. While reported crimes, as mentioned, are increasing, the victim studies show a stable level in Sweden. The two series might, however, still be compatible. The number of offences reported in the victim studies is several times higher than the number reported to the police. Crimes of violence occurring out-of-doors between strangers, cases which are usually reported to the police, might very well have risen. At the same time, other types of crimes of violence, reported primarily in victim surveys might have declined so that a picture of an overall stable development emerges from these surveys. In order to give a more complete explanation of this discrepancy, it would be necessary to co-ordinate official crime statistics and the victim surveys in a better way. They would each have to accommodate the categories of the other, so as to facilitate comparison.

The fourth reservation concerns the discrepancy between the victim surveys and the "real" level of crimes of violence. Even though more violence is reported in the interview studies than to the police, most intra-group violence, including violence in the family, will not be reported in standardized interviews (Persson 1976). This is so because interviewees will feel shame or fear or experience the violence as a private matter unrelated to the penal law categories. That the dark figure for this source as well here is probably quite large means that changes in victimization risks over time could easily be the re-

sult of changes in reporting, for instance, as a result of an ongoing public debate about violence in the family.

The fifth and final reservation concerns the question of threats of violence, which were also included in the Swedish surveys. The problem of reliability is of particular importance here. In follow-up interviews after two weeks, a large proportion of interviewees have forgotten the serious threats they reported half a month earlier, and others report threats which they had not thought of on the first occasion. This issue was omitted from the final analysis in the study of the Swedish Institute for Social Research (Tham 1984).

An additional problem concerning the victim studies is the question of fear of crime, which is included in the surveys done by Statistics Sweden. Objective and subjective experiences do not always coincide. Those who are most likely to express fear of crime in the interviews are also those who are least likely to be victimized, that is, elderly women. This is not to imply that the fear expressed by the elderly should be disregarded. It does, however, become problematic in a policy perspective. What should the Ministry of Justice officials base their decisions on?

The data on fear of crime also underline the importance of not interpreting crime rates mechanically. The harm and fear caused by crime depends among other things on the economic compensation from insurance policies, on the relation between the victim and the perpetrator, on the degree of isolation of the victim, and on the state of general anxiety in society. The crime curve in the diagram is not a uni-dimensional indicator of the development of evil.

Crime as an indicator of stigmatization

The fourth manner to regard crime is from the standpoint of stigmatization or social reaction. The official rates of crime and convictions are interpreted as the output of the law enforcement and treatment system. The analysis should then try to explain the amount and forms of control of marginalized persons which characterize different societies. Much of the writings on the subject of control in the modern Western societies have centered on the question of welfare-state

specific forms of control. The description and evaluation of the control, however, differs markedly.

The ideological overtones are more manifest in this type of approach to the study of crime, since the question of the legitimacy of the state become crucial. The perspective therefore requires a much more thorough discussion - a discussion which, however, cannot be undertaken here.

Recommendations

The main problem with using crime as a social indicator is that crime is a rare event. If trivial offences are excluded, the number of persons in a year who have experienced crime as a perpetrator or as a victim constitutes but a small fraction of the population. It could be argued that crime is not relevant as a general social indicator, which otherwise should refer to the experiences of a larger number of people.

One way of justifying crime as a social indicator is, however, that crime rates in fact also have something to say about those who have not been found guilty of crime; something about the processes underway in the entire population. Such attempts have been discussed here under the headings "intergration" and "marginalization". In this way the crime rates become more generally relevant, but at the same time, the interpretations became more uncertain or even of a speculative nature.

This tension between indicators of great relevance and of high validity is probably to some degree unavoidable. In official social reporting, it would also be difficult to include indicators based on more speculative interpretations. Still, I think it would be valuable to include some measure of crime in official social reporting. I will end this presentation with some recommendations for specific indicators that could be used, and why. All of the indicators can be collected from the official criminal statistics at no cost. The five

indicators to be introduced briefly are homicide, assault, burglary, robbery, and imprisonment.

Homicide

The validity of the homicide rate can be relatively well established by using cause-of-death statistics as a control. The justification for bringing homicide into social reporting is primarily that it can be compared to other types of unnatural death which generally are of great concern to the public. The often exaggerated ideas about the risk of death as a result of homicide could be presented along with figures on death as a result of traffic accidents, other accidents, alcoholrelated deaths, and suicides.

Assault

Assault as it appears in the police statistics is probably a poor indicator of the general level and development of criminal violence in society. The type of assault which is most threatening to the public - outdoor violence between strangers - does carry some validity in the police statistics, though (see Lenke 1989b). In order to use the official figures here for regular social reporting, the categories of the police statistics must be adapted to this type of violence, and victim surveys should also be brought in as occasional checks.

Burglary

Burglaries in homes are probably reported to the police to a very high degree, both because of their perceived seriousness and because of insurance requirements. By limiting the risk of becoming the victim of theft to home burglaries, the indicator becomes more robust. And even though this makes the measured event relatively rare, it is experi-

enced by many victims - though by no means all of them as a serious threat in a quality-of-life perspective.

Robbery

Robbery is usually committed by persons with low criminal skills, high recidivism rates, and severe alcohol and/or narcotics abuse problems. The development of robbery might therefore be an important indicator of tendencies of marginalization of some segments of the population. Both robbery and recidivism have shown very sharp increases since World War II in Sweden - development which might indicate a more general change in society (von Hofer 1985).

Imprisonment

Data on the number of prison sentences and the average prison population are of value whether they reflect the crime level or not. To be in prison means to be deprived of many things which are valued in life. It is therefore an indicator of (non)welfare for a fraction of the population. And even if this fraction is very small, it is not negligible in sub-populations such as among blacks in the United States.

Prison data can serve as a social indicator in yet another way. Imprisonment is in most Western countries the utmost means of control that the state uses against its citizens. The detrimental effects of imprisonment are well documented. It represents a breakdown in relations in civil society and a use of force which should be avoided as far as possible.

A limitation in the use of prison is therefore an end in itself. The criminal policy of a nation is, to quote the former director of the Swedish council for crime prevention, Bo Svensson (1988), a part of its cultural policy. So why not include the size of the prison population in a comparative perspective among the cultural indicators in the social reports?

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IX. SECURITY

Question 135 a 45 1 2	HAVE YOU DURING THE PAST TWELVE MONTHS BEEN THE VICTIM OF THEFT? Yes _____ No → Question 136 a Note
Question 135 b 46	HOW MANY TIMES? Number of times
Question 135 c 47	WAS/WERE THE THEFT(S) REPORTED TO THE POLICE? Number of thefts reported to the police Note <div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px; float: right;">No is coded as zero reports</div>
Question 136 a 48 1 2	HAS IT HAPPENED DURING THE PAST TWELVE MONTHS THAT ANYONE HAS DAMAGED OR DESTROYED ANY PROPERTY OF YOURS? (WILFUL DAMAGE, NOT BY ACCIDENT) Yes _____ No → Question 137 a Note
Question 136 b 49	HOW MANY TIMES? Number of times
Question 136 c 50	WAS THE DAMAGE REPORTED TO THE POLICE? Number of times damage reported to the police Note <div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px; float: right;">No is coded as zero reports</div>
Question 137 51 1 2 Question 137 b 52-56	<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px; margin-bottom: 10px;"> If the respondent has been the victim of theft according to Q 135 and/or damage to property according to Q 136 ask Q 137. Otherwise go to Question 138 a </div> DID THE THEFT/DAMAGE LEAD TO ECONOMIC LOSS NOT COVERED BY INSURANCE OR BY OTHER MEANS? Yes _____ No → Question 138 a Note APPROXIMATELY HOW MUCH DID YOUR LOSS AMOUNT TO ALTOGETHER? Crowns worth lost through theft and/or damage

Question 138 a			IN THE LAST TWELVE MONTHS, HAVE YOU BEEN EXPOSED TO ANY OF THE FOLLOWING?
	Yes	No	
57	1	2	Violence causing visible marks or injury?
58	1	2	Violence not causing visible marks or injury?
59	1	2	Threat or threats that were dangerous or serious enough to frighten you?
			<div style="border: 1px solid black; display: inline-block; padding: 2px;">If no on all items</div> → Question 139 a
			Note.....
		
			If yes on any question on violence or threat (according to 138 a):
Question 138 b			DID ANY OF THIS OCCUR
	Yes	No	
60	1	2	in a dwelling?
61	1	2	at your workplace?
62	1	2	on a train, bus, subway or train-, bus- or subway station
63	1	2	at a restaurant, dancing hall, people's park or the like
64	1	2	on the street, market, square or other public place
65	1	2	Other place, which?.....
		
Question 138 c			WAS ANY OF THIS REPORTED TO THE POLICE?
66	1		Yes
	2		No
			Note.....

IX. SICHERHEIT FÜR LEBEN UND EIGENTUM

Frage 135a	HATTEN SIE WÄHREND DER LETZTEN ZWÖLF MONATE EINEN DIEBSTAHL?	
45	1	Ja _____
	2	Nein _____ → Frage 136a
	Bemerkung:	
Frage 135b	WIEVIELE MALE?	
46	Anzahl Male <input type="text"/>	
Frage 135c	WURDE DER DIEBSTAHL / WURDEN DIE DIEBSTÄHLE DER POLIZEI GEMELDET?	
47	Anzahl Diebstähle, welche der Polizei gemeldet wurden <input type="text"/> NEIN WIRD MIT 0 KODIERT	
	Bemerkung:	
Frage 136a	KAM ES WÄHREND DER LETZTEN ZWÖLF MONATE EINMAL VOR, DASS JEMAND IHR EIGENTUM BESCHÄDIGT ODER ZERSTÖRT HAT? (Schadenanrichtung, nicht Unglücksfall)	
48	1	Ja _____
	2	Nein _____ → Frage 137a
	Bemerkung:	
Frage 136b	WIEVIELE MALE?	
49	Anzahl Male <input type="text"/>	
Frage 136c	WURDE DIE BESCHÄDIGUNG DER POLIZEI GEMELDET?	
50	Anzahl Beschädigungen, welche der Polizei gemeldet wurden <input type="text"/> NEIN WIRD MIT 0 KODIERT	
	Bemerkung:	
FALLS IP GEMÄSS FRAGE 135 DIEBSTAHL UND/ODER GEMÄSS FRAGE 136 BESCHÄDIGUNGEN HATTE, WIRD FRAGE 137 GESTELLT. ANDERNFALLS WIRD MIT FRAGE 138a FORTGESETZT.		
Frage 137a	FUEHRTE DER DIEBSTAHL / DIE BESCHÄDIGUNG EINEN FINANZIELLEN VERLUST FÜR SIE MIT SICH, WELCHER NICHT DURCH VERSICHERUNGEN ODER AUF ANDERE WEISE GEDECKT WURDE?	
51	1	Ja _____
	2	Nein _____ → Frage 138a
	Bemerkung:	
Frage 137b	WIEVIEL GELD VERLOREN SIE DABEI UNGEFÄHR (INSGESAMT)?	
52 56	Kronen Verlust durch Diebstahl und/oder Beschädigung <input type="text"/>	

Frage 138a

Ja Nein

WAREN SIE WÄHREND DER LETZTEN ZWÖLF MONATEN EINER ODER EINIGEN DER
FOLGENDEN HANDLUNGEN AUSGESETZT?

57 1 2

Gewalt, welche zu sichtbaren Zeichen oder Körperschaden führte?

58 1 2

Gewalt, welche nicht zu sichtbaren Zeichen oder Verletzung führte

59 1 2

Bedrohung oder Drohungen, die gefährlich waren, oder so ernsthaft,
dass Sie Angst bekamen?

FALLS NEIN BEI SÄMTLICHEN —————> Frage 139a

Bemerkung:

.....

Frage 138b

Falls Ja zu einer Frage über Gewalt oder Bedrohung (in Frage 138a):

PASSIERTE DIES/ETWAS DAVON ...

60 1 2

In Ihrer Wohnung oder einer andern Wohnung

61 1 2

An Ihrem Arbeitsplatz

62 1 2

Im Zug, Buss, der Untergrundbahn, oder an einer ihrer Stationen?

63 1 2

Im Restaurant / Wirtshaus, an einer Tanzstelle, in einem Volkspark oder
an einem anderen Vergnügungsplatz

64 1 2

Auf der Strasse, einem Platz / Markt oder an einer andern öffentlichen
Stelle

65 1 2

An einem andern Platz, welchem?

.....

Frage 138c

WURDE DIES / EIN SOLCHES EREIGNIS DER POLIZEI GEMELDET?

-66- -1

Ja

2

Nein

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